I propose a game-theoretical model to estimate demand for telephone service, accounting for intra-household interaction among household members. Although multiple Nash equilibria of subscription decisions may exist in a household, the model parameters are identified from the household-level data. I analyze the demand in Taiwan by a semiparametric maximum likelihood estimation. The distribution of the estimated intrahousehold effects of cellular phone service stochastically dominates that of landline phone service, suggesting the network effect of cellular phone service is stronger. On average, the marginal intra-household effect of cellular service increases the probability of subscription by 35 percentage points while that of landline service increases the probability by merely 8 percentage points. Moreover, I analyze how the heterogeneity of intra-household effects varies with household characteristics. Intra-household effect of cellular phone service increases in income, but decreases in the number of kids and the age difference in a household.
Introduction
Standard microeconomic theory analyzes consumer behavior based on individual preferences.
When more than one person lives in a household, we need to take into account the intrahousehold allocation of resources and consumption externalities among household members.
Consequently, a consumer's decision depends on other household member's choices. In this paper, I use a game-theoretical framework to estimate the intra-household effect on the consumption of telephone service. There is a rich literature on estimating household demand for telecommunication service. Generally, these studies use household-level survey data.
Nonetheless, each household is treated as a single decision-maker in the estimation. Only household heads' individual characteristics are included in the demand estimation. This approach implicitly assumes the demand to be solely determined by household heads. Other members can influence the decision only indirectly through household-level variables. 1 This assumption is unlikely to be true in most households.
As Browning, Bourguignon, Chaippori, and Lechene (1994) point out, household behavior depends on intra-household interactions unless we impose some restrictive hypotheses such as transferable utilities. They propose a collective household model: Household members bargain with each other to allocate their overall resources. Individual consumption depends on the allocation. The bargaining power depends on individual characteristics. The resource allocation must achieve Pareto efficient in the bargaining process. Using data on couples with no kids, they find that the allocation of expenditure depends on the relative incomes and ages of the couples, rejecting the hypotheses of a single decision-maker in a household. See Vermeulen (2002) for further discussions on the collective household model. I consider a model of binary subscription choices. When there is only a single person in a household, this model reduces to a standard discrete choice model. When more than one 1 Train, McFadden, and Ben-Akiva (1987) and Train, Ben-Akiva, and Atherton (1989) only consider aggregate household income. In the estimation of demand for local telephone service under optional rate plans, Miravete (2002) includes several household-level characteristics. His empirical analysis only accounts for household head's individual characteristics, but not other members' characteristics. Many previous researches (Rappoport and Taylor, 1997; Solvason, 1997; Madden and Simpson, 1997; Duffy-Deno, 2001; Rodini, Ward, and Woroch, 2003; Economides, Seim, and Viard, 2006) use similar approach in estimating telephone demand.
person lives in a household, consumption externalities among the members may affect their demand. For example, if the husband has a cellular phone, the wife may have a stronger desire to own a cellular phone as well. There are several potential positive spillover effect. First, the direct network effect: the husband can be contacted by phone even when he is away from a landline phone. This increases the wife's demand for phone. Second, the indirect network effect: the husband's knowledge of cellular service reduces the wife's information cost of subscription decision. Third, the price effect: when the price of a cellular-to-cellular phone call is lower than a landline-to-cellular phone call 2 , the wife pays less for a call from a cellular phone than from a landline phone. Besides, carriers often offer family plans which lowers the subscription fee for a second cellular phone. On the other hand, the spillover effect may be negative if a cellular phone is a public good in a household. Then, each household member wants to be a free-rider and shares the usage of other person's cellular phone. Whether the net effect is positive or negative is an empirical issue. The objective of the paper is to estimate the sign and the size of spill over effects for both cellular phone service and lineline phone service. Because it is more difficult to share the usage of a cellular phone, positive effects are more likely to dominate for cellular phone service than for landline service. My empirical findings confirm this conjecture.
In the current paper, I restrict my attention to households with two members. Each of the two members makes a binary choice on the subscription of telephone service. My model is similar to entry models in the industrial organization literature, such as Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) . However, the spillover effects between two firms in an entry model are always negative. The entrance of one firm reduces the profit of the other firm. Their entry decisions must be strategic substitutes. For household consumption behavior, the effects may be either positive or negative. When they are positive, the decisions are strategic complements. I do not restrict the sign of intra-household effects in the estimation. The sign can vary across households. I will investigate how the effects affected by household characteristics. Different from Browning et al. (1994) 's collected household model, the allocation is not necessarily Pareto optimal.
The primary difficulty in the estimation is to deal with multiple Nash equilibria. When intra-household effect is negative, we can estimate the model by using the equilibrium number of subscribers in a household, which has unique equilibrium, as in Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) 's entry model. On the contrary, when intra-household effect is positive, this approach does not work because the equilibrium number of subscribers may have multiple Nash equilibria as well. To deal with multiple Nash equilibria, we can impose rules to select among these equilibria. For example, in a recent paper, Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2007) suggest a simulation-based method to estimate the selection rule. The estimation approach in this paper is an extension of Tamer (2003) . He restricts the effect of the interaction between agents to be a constant and proposes a nonparametric estimation to determine the selection among multiple equilibria. In this paper, I generalize his model and allow the effect of the interaction to be determined by observed household characteristics. I show that the parameters in my demand model can be pointwise identified as long as we have household-level data.
I apply the econometric approach to study the demand for two telephone services, cellular and lineline phone services, in Taiwan. My data come from the 2003 Family Income and Expenditure Survey. The estimated marginal intra-household effect of cellular phone service increases the probability of subscription by 35.24 percentage points for an average consumer.
The effect is positive for all households, meaning that positive spillover effects are more important than negative ones. Variation of the effects across households can be explained by their characteristics. Intra-household effects increase in household income, but decrease in the number of kids and the age difference in a household. As for the demand of landline service, the average intra-household effect is also positive, but its magnitude is much smaller. On average, the marginal effect increases the probability of subscription by only 8.08 percentage points.
Another important contribution of this paper is to estimate the direct effect of both household-level and individual-level characteristics on telephone demand after controlling for intra-household effects. Previous researches only include household characteristics in the estimation. As a result, it is difficult to identify the effect of some individual demographic variables such as gender. In this paper, I find females have higher demand for landline phone service than males, but lower demand for cellular phone service. Moreover, household income by itself has a negative effect on telephone consumption, but individual income has a positive effect. Nonetheless, the total effect for an increase in a consumer's income is positive.
Consequently, both cellular and landline phone services are estimated to be normal goods. 
Econometric Model
The presence of intra-household effect means that consumption depends on the decision of other household members. In this section, I present a static discrete response model which is an extension of the probit model. I will estimate the demand for cellular phone service and landline phone service separately. I restrict my attention to households with two members and show that the model parameters are fully identified despite the existence of multiple Nash equilibria in a noncooperative game between the two household members.
Discrete Response Model
For household i, there are two members j ∈ {1, 2}. All characteristics of each member are observed by both members. Household-level characteristics, such as household income, residence location, . . . , etc., are common to both member, while individual-level characteristics, such as individual income, age, . . . etc., are not. Furthermore, some characteristics, such as tastes on new technology, are observed only by the two household members, but not by the econometrician.
A consumer's subscription decision depends on the direct effect of consumption and the intra-household effect of consumption. The former effect is determined by the consumer's own individual-level characteristics as well as the household-characteristics in her household.
The latter effect depends on the choice of the other household member. This magnitude is normalized to zero when the other member does not subscribe. I assume the intra-household is reciprocal between the two members and determined by household-level characteristics.
Let the binary variable y ij ∈ {0, 1} denote the subscription decision of individual j in household i. Let y ij = 1 if and only if the individual subscribes to a telephone service. The demand is characterized by
where (3 − j) is the index for the other member in the household. The terms in the first bracket of equation (1) represents the direct effect of consumption choice. The term in the second bracket, z ′ i γ, is the intra-household effect. The vector x ij is j's observed characteristics by and the scalar ε ij is her unobserved characteristics. The vector z i includes all householdlevel characteristics which affect intra-household effect. To identify the model parameters, at least one of the elements in the vector x ij (such as member i's age) is not a household-level characteristic. Furthermore, both x ij and z i contain a constant term. 3 My model reduces to the standard probit model if the intra-household effect vanishes (γ = 0).
The unobserved characteristics (ε i1 , ε i2 ) are assumed to be jointly normally distributed, independently across households.
The variance of ε ij is normalized to one. The correlation coefficient ρ in (2) is to be estimated.
Finally, let Y i = y i1 + y i2 denote the total number of subscribers in the household.
-6 (y i1 , y i2 ) = (0, 1) 
Nash Equilibria
Consider a simultaneous-move non-cooperative game. 4 This is similar to the incomplete model discussed in Tamer (2003) . Figure 1 shows the set of equilibria for positive intra-
. Both (y i1 , y i2 ) = (0, 0) and (y i1 , y i2 ) = (1, 1) are equilibria in this region. Nonetheless, the model predicts the exact probability for (y i1 , y i2 ) = (0, 1) 
On the other hand, when the effect is negative (z ′ i γ < 0), there are multiple equilibria of (0, 1) and (1, 0) Figure 2 .) The model gives the exact probabilities of (y i1 , y i2 ) = (0, 0) and (y i1 , y i2 ) = (1, 1).
Regardless the sign of intra-household effect, the exact probability of observing one subscriber in a household (Y i = y i1 + y i2 = 1) for given observed characteristics (x i1 , x i2 , z i ) can 8 be obtain from the model.
where 1{·} denotes the indicator function.
However, the exact probabilities of no subscriber (Y i = 0) and two subscribers (Y i = 2) in a household are unknown when intra-household effect is positive because we do not know how individuals choose among multiple Nash equilibria. 5 Without loss of generality, we only need to focus on the probability Pr
The probability of no subscriber in a household is bounded in an interval. The upper bound occurs when individuals always fail to coordinate their decisions in the event of multiple Nash equilibria.
The lower bound is achieved when individuals can perfectly coordinate.
Identification
Although multiple Nash equilibria are possible, the parameters in the econometric model are pointwise identified. My model is similar to but more complicated than Tamer (2003 
Then the parameters,
Proof. In equation (3), I have shown that the exact probabilities of Y i = 1, which is denoted
, can be obtained for any given observed characteristics (x i1 , x i2 , z i ).
Without loss of generality, assume β k > 0. Let ( β, γ, ρ) be different from (β, γ, ρ). I will consider four possible cases.
Case 1: β = β and β k > 0: As x i1k goes to minus infinity for given x −i1k , both x i1k β k and
x i1k β k go to minus infinity. Because X 2 has full rank, there exists
This implies the parameters (β, γ, ρ) are identified.
Case 2: β = β and β k < 0: Since Z has full rank, there exists z * i such that z * ′ i γ = z * ′ i γ when γ = γ. If the parameters are not identified, then
for any x i2 as x i1k → −∞ for given x −i1k , and
for any x i2 as x i1k → +∞ for given x −i1k . Since ε i2 is a symmetric distribution with zero mean, Equations (6) and (7) together imply
This is a contradiction. Therefore, equations (6) and (7) cannot hold together, implying the parameters (β, γ, ρ) are identified when γ = γ.
If γ = γ, either equation (6) or (7) implies that x ′ i2 (β + β) + z * ′ i γ = 0 holds for any (x i2 , z i ). This contradicts with the fact that X 2 and Z both have full rank.
Therefore, I can identify the parameters.
Similarly, for z ′ i γ < 0, I can obtain
Therefore, ρ can be identified from the data.
Note that, identification of the coefficients (β, γ) only depends on the marginal distribution of the idiosyncratic preferences (ε i1 , ε i2 ), not on their joint distribution. (2003), to obtain the parameters in the demand model.
Semiparametric Maximum Likelihood Estimator
Define the conditional probability of the event {Y i = 0} for observed characteristics
When the function H is known, I can write down the likelihood, and the parameters (β, γ, ρ)
are estimated by maximizing the logarithm of the likelihood function. For a random sample with size N , 6 the logarithm of the likelihood function is
The unknown function H(x i1 , x i2 , z i ) represents the probability of observing no subscriber in a household. From equations (4) and (5), we know that
when multiple Nash equilibria exist, but the model cannot predict the exact probability. To overcome this difficulty, I follow
Tamer (2003)'s suggestion to approximate the unknown function by a kernel regression of the
, I truncate the result of the kernel regression by the upper and lower bounds and denote the value asĤ(x i1 , x i2 , z i ; β, γ, ρ).
Replace H in the likelihood (8) The survey data I use to perform estimation is not a random sample. Therefore, I need to adjust for the sampling weights in my calculation. To ease the exposition, however, I present the estimator for a random sample in this section. 7 I use Gaussian kernel to estimate H(xi1, xi2, zi).
where φ is the density function of a standard normal distribution, and the metric d is defined as
A bandwidth B = 0.3 is used for the following results. The parameter estimates are robust to changes in the bandwidth B. 8 These two matrices are asymptotically equal for a random sample. However, for the survey data, I need to account for sampling weights in the estimation and the matrices are not asymptotically equal.
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sumption decisions, the kernel estimation of H(x i1 , x i2 , z i ) will converge to P L 0 (x i1 , x i2 , z i ) in probability. Similarly, if individuals make decisions sequentially, then the subsame-prefect equilibrium is also included in the set of Nash equilibria under a simultaneous non-cooperative game.
Data
The (TWD) . 9 Note that household income is more than twice of individual income in the subsample because part of the household income cannot be attributed to either member. The mean of age in the subsample is considerably older than that in the entire population. This is reasonable because families with one or more teenagers living together with their parents are excluded in the subsample. Households in the subsample also tends to have lower total 9 The average exchange rate between US dollars and Taiwan dollars in 2003 is 1 USD = 34.42 TWD. income because their sizes are smaller on average. Besides, households in the subsample are modestly more likely to live in the South region. 10 I only observe the total numbers of cellular phones and landline phones in a household. Table 2 summarizes the distributions of the number of telephones among households with two members. When the total is zero, obviously neither member subscribes to the phone service. When it is one, only one member in the household choose to subscribe, and the other member does not. When there is more than one phone, I assume that both individuals choose to have one. In my data, 3% of two-member households own more than two cellular phones, and 1% of households have more than two landline phones.
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Empirical Results
In this section, I apply the estimation method introduced in Section 2 to analyze the demand for telephone services in Taiwan. I first estimate the demand for cellular phone service, and then the demand for landline phone service. At the end of this section, I compare intra-household effects on the consumption of these two telephone services.
Demand for Cellular Phone Service
The parameter estimates for the choice of cellular phone service subscription are presented in removes the variables which are not significantly different from zero in (C). According to the likelihood-ratio test, there is significant improvement in the likelihood from (A), (B) to (C), but no significant difference between (C) and (D) at the conventional level. Consequently, I select Column (D) as the preferred specification.
The magnitude of intra-household effect in a household can be expressed as the marginal effect of one member's subscription decision on the other member. For member j in household i, the marginal effect is
Based on the parametersβ andγ estimated in Column (D), I compute the marginal effect for each individual. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the estimated marginal effects due to the externalities among household members. All of the estimated effects are positive. On average, the effect increases subscription by 35.24 percentage points, with a standard deviation of 10.50 Figure 3 : Histogram of the estimated intra-household effects for cellular phone service percentage points. When the other household member chooses to subscribe, its average effect is equivalent to the effect caused by increasing a consumer's own individual income by 757 thousand TWD (equal to 21,992 USD) and holding the other household member's income fixed. The existence of positive intra-household effects suggests the existence of network effects of cellular phone service within a household.
As Figure 3 illustrates, intra-household effects vary a lot across households. Estimate of the vector γ differs significantly from zero at 5% level for several variables, providing explanations for the heterogeneity. Intra-household effects increase in household income statistically and economically significant. Increasing household income by one standard deviation (603 thousand TWD) raises the marginal intra-household effect by 10.4 percentage points. Households in cities have larger intra-household effect than those in towns by 4.0 percentage points.
The number of kids has a negative effect, probably because families with more kids tend to spend more time together and hence reduce the network effect of cellular phone service.
Interestingly, similar to the findings in Browning et al. (1994) , intra-household effects are Contrary to most previous researches on telecommunication demand, I can estimate the direct effect (β) of both household-level and individual-level characteristics. The demand increases in individual income but decreases in household income. The magnitude of the former effect is almost twice the magnitude of the latter one. An increase in one member's individual income increases his demand, but decreases the other member's demand through higher household income. As for the geographic variables, the direct effect is lower in the Central region at the 10% significantly level, but it is essentially indifferent between the North and South regions. There is also no difference between cities, towns, and rural areas. Table 4 and Table 5 show the penetration rate of cellular service across regions and across urbanization levels. Although the penetration rates are higher in the North region and in 20 cities and lower in the South region and in rural areas, the demand for cellular phone service does not have a systematic relationship with the penetration rates. Consequently, there is no evidence showing the existence of network effects resulting from geographic neighborhoods.
Lastly, the direct effects on demand for cellular phone service resulting from individual characteristics are consistent with intuition. The demand is stronger for young, bettereducated, and employed people. Females have weaker demand than males though the difference is significant only at the 10% level. The estimation result is probably because young and better-educated people are more familiar with new technology. Employed people spend more time away from home, so they are likely to have higher demand.
Demand for Landline Phone Service
Next, I apply the same estimation approach to study the demand for landline phone service.
The results are presented in Table 6 . 11 Similar to the estimation of the demand for cellular phone service, I restrict intra-household effects to be zero in Column (A) and the effects to be a constant in Column (B). All the observed characteristics are included in the estimation of Column (C). Finally, In Column (E), I exclude variables which are insignificant in Column (C). By the likelihood ratio tests, Column (C) fits the data significantly better than Column (A) and (B), but there is no significant difference between (C) and (E). Consequently, Column (E) is the preferred specification for the demand of landline phone service.
The distribution of the estimated marginal intra-household effects is illustrated in Figure   4 . Its mean is 8.08 percentage points and the standard deviation is 4.53 percentage points. I find 98.20% of the estimated effects are positive. Consequently, there exists within-household network effect of landline phone service for most households. The intra-household effect for landline phone demand is significantly higher in the North region, but it decrease in the number of kids, the average age, and the education difference in a household. Different from the intra-household effect on cellular phone consumption, household income does not have Figure 4 : Histogram of the estimated externalities for landline phone service significant impact.
As for the direct effect on landline phone demand, household income has a negative effect while individual income has a positive effect. The magnitude of the latter effect is approximately 5 times of the former one. Therefore, the net effect of an increase in a consumer's income on landline phone demand is positive. Several previous studies on the estimation of demand for landline phone service in the U.S. have found household income and education to have negative effects on demand. 12 These results suggest landline phone service to be an inferior good. My estimation finds the opposite is true. While household income by itself has a negative effect, the total effect of an income increase is not. Holding the other household member's income fixed, the overall effect of an increase in a consumer's income is positive.
Consequently, landline phone service is a normal good.
In addition, the direct effects of other individual-level characteristics are discussed as the 
Comparison of Intra-Household Effects
I compare the intra-household effect of cellular phone service with that of landline phone service. The former one is clearly higher than the latter one on average. The average intrahousehold effect of cellular phone is estimated to be 35.24%, while the average effect of landline phone is 8.08%. Moreover, as Figure 5 shows, the distribution of the former one stochastically dominates the distribution of the latter one. This finding is intuitive. Intra-household network effects of cellular phone service are larger than the effects of landline phone service. However, it is less common for people to share a cellular phone with their family, but it is easier to be a free rider on landline phones. Therefore, intra-household effects are larger for cellular phone service.
Conclusion
I empirically analyze intra-household effects on the demand for cellular and landline phone services. Because of the interaction between household members, it is possible to have multiple equilibria in a non-cooperative simultaneous game. Nonetheless, the model parameters are fully identified from the household-level data. I use a semiparametric maximum likelihood estimator to study the demand for cellular phone service in Taiwan. The intra-household effects of cellular phone service are large than the effects of landline phone service by first-order dominance. I also analyze how the intra-household effects vary with household characteristics. Furthermore, I estimate the direct effects of telephone service consumption resulting from observed characteristics, after accounting for the intra-household effects. I find household income and individual income to have different direct effects on the subscription choices of cellular phone and landline phone services.
In the current paper, I consider demand for cellular phone service and for landline phone service separately. An interesting extension is to estimate demand for these two services jointly. Another important future work is to include households with more than two individuals. Contrary to the two-member case, the exact probability of any observed event is unknown due to multiple equilibria. The parameters are only partially identified by inequalities.
